Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing

SCADA/ICS Vulnerability Assessment

  • May 10, 2025
  • 0

🏭 Sherlocked Security – SCADA/ICS Vulnerability Assessment

Secure Your Industrial Control Systems Before Attackers Cause Operational Disruption

📄 1. Statement of Work (SOW)

Service Name: SCADA / ICS Vulnerability Assessment
Target Systems: PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, DCS, SCADA Servers, Industrial Gateways
Client Type: Manufacturing, Energy, Water Treatment, Oil & Gas, Smart Grids
Service Model: Offline Analysis + Limited On-site Active Testing
Compliance Coverage: NIST 800-82, IEC 62443, NERC CIP, ISO 27019

Scope Includes:

  • Network Segmentation & Architecture Review
  • SCADA Protocol Assessment (Modbus, DNP3, OPC, BACnet, IEC 60870-5-104)
  • PLC/HMI Firmware & Configuration Audit
  • Authentication & Access Control Weaknesses
  • Physical Layer Risks (USB, Serial, Console)
  • Remote Access, VPN & Historian Exposure
  • Safety System and Fail-Safe Configuration Checks

🧠 2. Our Approach

🔹 Passive data collection to avoid disrupting critical operations
🔹 Protocol fuzzing and command injection simulations in staging environments
🔹 Architecture risk modeling for lateral movement and safety compromise

[Asset Inventory] → [Network Segmentation Audit] → [Protocol/Service Mapping] → [Access Control Testing] → [Firmware Config Review] → [Attack Simulation (Offline)] → [Reporting & Fixes]

🧪 3. Methodology

[Kickoff & Risk Scoping] → [Passive Asset Discovery] → [Network Diagram Review] → [Protocol & Port Mapping] → [Device-Specific Vulnerability Research] → [Configuration Extraction & Analysis] → [Offline Simulation of Exploits] → [Remediation Plan] → [Follow-up Testing]

📦 4. Deliverables to the Client

  1. 🏗️ SCADA Network Architecture & Segmentation Map
  2. 📘 Technical Vulnerability Report:
    • Device vulnerabilities (firmware/config)
    • Protocol-level flaws (unauthenticated commands)
    • Remote Access Weaknesses
    • Physical/Environmental Security Gaps
    • Authentication and Role/Access Flaws
  3. 📊 Attack Path & Impact Modeling
  4. 📜 CVE/CVSS Ratings for ICS Device Issues
  5. 🧩 Configuration Hardening Recommendations
  6. 🛡️ NIST/IEC Mapping for Audit Readiness
  7. 🔁 Retest Plan (post-remediation)

🤝 5. What We Need from You (Client Requirements)

  • ✅ Network topology diagram
  • ✅ Asset inventory with make/model of PLCs, HMIs, RTUs
  • ✅ Access to staging/test environment if available
  • ✅ Read-only access or cloned configs (for analysis)
  • ✅ Points of contact for each system vendor/operator
  • ✅ Change window for limited active testing (optional)

🧰 6. Tools & Technology Stack

  • 🧠 Passive scanners: Wireshark, Zeek, GRASSMARLIN
  • 🧪 Protocol fuzzers: ModScan, ModbusPal, OPC UA Fuzzer
  • 🛠️ Firmware tools: Binwalk, PLCScan, Firmware-Mod-Kit
  • 🔍 Nmap w/ NSE + Nessus ICS plugins
  • 🔒 SCADA-specific CVE DBs (e.g., MITRE, ICS-CERT, Siemens Advisories)
  • 📜 Custom scripts for command injection testing
  • 🖥️ Secure jumpboxes for isolated access

🚀 7. Engagement Lifecycle (Lead → Closure)

1. Scope Finalization → 2. NDA + Architecture Intake → 3. Passive Recon & Asset Mapping → 4. Config Extraction & Firmware Audit → 5. Controlled Exploit Simulations → 6. Draft Report → 7. Remediation Support → 8. Optional Retesting → 9. Compliance Mapping & Closure

🌟 8. Why Sherlocked Security? (Our USP)

Feature Sherlocked Advantage
🔍 Passive & Non-Intrusive Testing Avoid system downtime while exposing flaws
⚙️ Protocol-Level Fuzzing Custom tools for Modbus, OPC, IEC protocols
🧠 Vendor-Specific Firmware Review Reverse engineering known vulnerable devices
🛡️ Compliance Mapped Reporting NIST 800-82, IEC 62443 alignment
🧩 Configuration + Network Audit From firewall to field device hardening
🎓 Post-Remediation Certificate For internal assurance & external audits

📚 9. Real-World Case Studies

⚙️ PLC Remote Code Execution via Insecure Firmware

Client: Manufacturing Plant
Issue: Siemens PLC allowed unsigned firmware update
Impact: Remote code injection from DMZ
Fix: Signed firmware update enforcement + segmentation

🌐 VPN Exposure of SCADA Console

Client: Water Utility Company
Issue: VPN access exposed unsegmented SCADA console
Impact: Operator override + process disruption
Fix: Network isolation + jumpbox access enforcement

🛡️ 10. SOP – Standard Operating Procedure

  1. Initial scoping & NDA
  2. Passive network recon & topology validation
  3. Protocol-specific service enumeration
  4. Authentication/ACL review
  5. Firmware/config analysis (vendor-specific)
  6. CVE/Zero-Day lookup & offline exploit simulations
  7. Impact/risk reporting
  8. Fix recommendation + compliance mapping
  9. Optional retesting & certification

📋 11. SCADA/ICS Security Checklist (Preview)

  1. Identify all ICS/SCADA devices and components.
  2. Evaluate network segmentation and architecture.
  3. Assess PLCs and RTUs for firmware vulnerabilities.
  4. Test HMI applications for input validation flaws.
  5. Check for outdated protocols (MODBUS, DNP3, etc.).
  6. Evaluate physical access controls and procedures.
  7. Analyze failover and recovery configurations.
  8. Assess wireless communications used in ICS.
  9. Review logging and alerting mechanisms.
  10. Perform passive monitoring to avoid disruption.

📬 Contact Us or 📅 Book a Consultation

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